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Internet Control or Internet Censorship? Comparing the 
Control Models of China, Singapore, and the United States 
to Guide Taiwan’s Choice 




 Internet censorship refers to a government’s unjustified scrutiny and control of online speech or 
government-approved control measures. The danger of Internet censorship is its chilling effect and 
substantial harm on free speech, a cornerstone of democracy, in cyberspace. This article compares 
China’s blocking and filtering system, Singapore’s class license system, and the United States’ 
government-private partnership model and identifies the features of each model. This article also 
explores the pros and cons of each model under international human rights standards. By finding lessons 
from each of the models, this article contends that Taiwan should retain its current minimal Internet 
control model. Further, Taiwan should fix flaws in its current Internet control system, including the 
private partnership model adopted by the Copyright Act, to be consistent with Article19.3 of the ICCPR.
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Internet Control or Internet Censorship? Comparing the 
Control Models of China, Singapore, and the United States 
to Guide Taiwan’s Choice 
Jeffrey (Chien-Fei) Li* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, Telus, a Canadian telephone company and Internet Service Provider 
(“ISP”), blocked subscribers from accessing the Telecommunications Workers 
Union (“TWU”) website.1 The reason for the block, according to Telus, was to stop 
the TWU site from inciting workers to jam Telus’s lines.2 The TWU argued that 
the move was an act of censorship.3 
A similar event occurred recently in Brazil. To comply with a court order, 
Google Brazil removed links to a video on YouTube that criticized a candidate in 
the Brazilian municipal elections.4 The court order found that the video would 
“offend the dignity or decorum” of the candidate.5 
Censorship, more specifically, Internet censorship is at the heart of the two 
cases. The concept of censorship, and just the word itself, evokes distaste and 
anxiety. Popular opinion opposes threats to the right to free speech and access to 
information in cyberspace.6 In comparison, Internet control is a more innocuous 
term. China’s regulation of the Internet is widely viewed as censorship, whereas the 
regulation by democratic Asian territories, such as Hong Kong and South Korea, is 
                                                          
* Harvard LL.M., 2013. 




4 Brazil: Google blocks YouTube video, NEWS 24 (Sept. 28, 2012, 11:00 AM), http:// 
www.news24.com/World/News/Brazil-Google-blocks-YouTube-video-20120928. 
5 Id. 
6 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 275 (2006) (concluding that the constitutional 
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viewed as Internet control.7 For instance, Hong Kong’s Crimes Ordinance and 
Telecommunications Ordinance, criminalize attempts to suppress information.8 The 
Crimes Ordinance also punishes both a dishonest intent to deceive with a view of 
obtaining gain for oneself or another and a dishonest intent to cause loss to 
another.9 In South Korea, the grounds for Internet control include defamation, child 
protection, obscenity, and subversive communication.10 These are all legitimate 
reasons under South Korean laws for ISPs to block access to the Internet.11 
Christian Oliver of the Financial Times also reports that South Korea blocks access 
to North Korean websites.12 
While South Korea’s Internet control is generally considered more pervasive 
than Hong Kong’s, it is not as rigorous as China’s infamous Great Firewall.13 Why 
does the world label China’s Internet control as censorship, while other countries’ 
Internet control systems do not incur such characterization? Is it simply because 
China is not a democracy? More specifically, at what point would we view the 
Internet control as censorship? 
                                                          
7 For instance, the OpenNet Initiative after conducting research made the conclusion to China’s 
Internet regulation as “lack of transparency, which has long been a hallmark of the government’s 
management and suppression of information.” In comparison, the conclusion on Hong Kong is that there 
is “no evidence of filtering,” and only some blockings exist. As to South Korea, though the OpenNet 
Initiative concluded that “its citizen do not have access to a free and unfiltered Internet,” it still 
considered the South Korea “imposes a substantial level of filtering for a free and democratic society.” 
RONALD DELBERT ET AL., ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
FILTERING 268, 372 (2008). 
8 See The Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, § 161 (H.K.) (1997), http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/ 
home.htm?SearchTerm=Criminal%20Jurisdiction%20Ordinance%20%28Amendment%20of%20Sectio
n%202%282%29%29%20Order%202002; see also The Telecommunications Ordinance, Cap. 106, 
§ 27A (H.K.) (2012), http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm?SearchTerm=Criminal%20 
Jurisdiction%20Ordinance%20%28Amendment%20of%20Section%202%282%29%29%20Order%202
002. 
9 See The Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, § 161 (H.K.) (1997), http://www.legislation.gov.hk/ 
eng/home.htm?SearchTerm=Criminal%20Jurisdiction%20Ordinance%20%28Amendment%20of%20Se
ction%202%282%29%29%20Order%202002. 
10 See South Korea, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 6, 2012), https://opennet.net/research/profiles/ 
south-korea#footnoteref30_tx3m2uh; see also Jongpil Chung, Comparing Online Activities in China 
and South Korea: The Internet and the Political Regime, 48 ASIAN SURVEY 5, 727–51 (2008). 
11 See id. 
12 Christian Oliver, Sinking underlines South Korean view of state as monster, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Apr. 1, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d77d855e-3d26-11df-b81b-00144feabdc0 
.html#axzz2OxDYLDkr. 
13 Compare Internet Censorship in Hong Kong, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Internet_censorship_in_Hong_Kong (last modified Aug. 19, 2013) (describing Internet censorship in 
Hong Kong as “very little”), with Internet Censorship in South Korea, WIKIPEDIA, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_censorship_in_South_Korea (last modified Sept. 8, 2013) (describing 
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There is still a lack of general consensus on how the Internet should be 
patrolled or regulated worldwide.14 As the Internet has woven itself into the daily 
lives of people across the planet, the control model a government chooses 
inevitably affects the flow of information, sparks free speech concerns, and gives 
rise to debate. At the center of the debate is whether constitutional or international 
human rights constraints on the freedom of speech in the physical world should be 
relaxed in cyberspace. 
To answer all those questions, as well as how Taiwan should create its own 
paradigm, requires an analysis of different existing Internet control models. This 
article will apply a comparative method to analyze Internet control models of 
China, Singapore, and United States and find the features of each model. The 
comparison between models will help in drawing a line between Internet control 
and censorship under the international human rights standard. With the features and 
distinctions of each model in mind, this article then recommends how Taiwan 
should choose its own Internet control model. 
China and Singapore were selected for this survey because, like Taiwan, their 
populations are primarily ethnic Chinese, making them culturally similar to 
Taiwan. The United States was selected because even though Taiwan is a civil law 
country, many Taiwanese laws are patterned after United States’ laws.15 The 
survey and the comparison that follows illustrate how constitutional and 
international human rights drive or clash with the different models of Internet 
control. 
Part I of this article concerns the current Internet control-related laws in 
Taiwan. Part II investigates how cyberspace is different from the physical world, 
and explores why Internet censorship is noxious. This part also discusses how the 
laws governing cyberspace should be different than those governing the physical 
world. Part III examines three different representative Internet control models: 
China’s blocking and filtering system, Singapore’s class licensing scheme, and the 
United States’ government-private partnership model. Additionally, this part 
applies international human rights standards under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) to determine the legitimacy of the three 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE 
FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 203–19 (2012) (introducing the internet governance issues); INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (Lee A. Bygrave & Jon Bing eds., 2009) (pointing 
out five possible models for regulating the internet). 
15 Compare, for example, the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006), with The 
Copyright Act (Taiwan), THE LEGISLATIVE YUEN’S LAW SYSTEM (in Chinese), available at 
http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@18:1804289383:f:NO%3DC701176*%20OR%20NO%3DC001176%2
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models. Part IV addresses how different constraints form different Internet control 
models and lessons drawn from the models comparison, and concludes by 
recommending an Internet control model to Taiwan. 
I. TAIWAN’S CURRENT INTERNET CONTROL: A U.S. MODEL 
FOLLOWER 
Taiwan is comparable to both Hong Kong and South Korea in that Taiwan is 
a democracy. Unlike Hong Kong and South Korea, however, Taiwan does not have 
a general Internet control system and has not taken any meaningful steps to patrol 
speech in cyberspace.16 
Taiwan is a civil law country. Most of its statutes are patterned after other 
countries’ legislation, mostly notably that of the United States, Germany, and 
Japan.17 Taiwan often borrows the reasoning of United States’ cases or its 
ordinances to guide patterns of the laws. For instance, the Constitutional Tribunal 
has cited United States laws as guidance in many of its interpretations.18 
Additionally, although the Taiwan Constitution has its own provisions and 
language, the Constitutional Tribunal often refers to international human rights 
treaties or conventions.19 These references are used to augment exposition of 
certain clauses when interpreting the Constitution.20 
                                                          
16 See discussion infra regarding Taiwan’s current meager Internet control scheme. 
17 See, e.g., HUNGDAH CHIU & JYH-PIN FA, TAIWAN’S LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL PROFESSION 1 
(1994) (“Chinese law as implemented and practiced in Taiwan today . . . it contains remnants of 
imperial Chinese law . . . while also borrowing heavily and adopting principles and concepts from civil 
law jurisdiction (such as German and Japan) as well as the United States”); BAKER & MCKENZIE, 
TAIWAN: A LEGAL BRIEF 12 (2002) (“Taiwan has a codified system of law . . . . The contents of the 
Codes were drawn from the laws of other countries with similar codified systems (e.g. Germany and 
Japan) and from traditional Chinese laws.”). 
18 See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 342, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL 
YUAN, R.O.C., http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=342 (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2013) (citing the United States’ Federal Supreme Court’s case Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 
(1890), as well as German and Japan’s court’s judgment to present the concept of parliamentary 
autonomy of the state council, which also demonstrates that Taiwan’s law are impacted by these three 
jurisdiction); J.Y. Interpretation No. 601, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL YUAN, 
R.O.C., http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=601 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2013). 
19 See, e.g., J.Y. Interpretation No. 587 & 623, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 
JUDICIAL YUAN, R.O.C. (both referring to the Convention on the Right of the Child); J.Y. Interpretation 
No. 582, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL YUAN, R.O.C. (referring to the European 
Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Right), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03.asp (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2013). 
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While Taiwan’s Internet control at this stage is minimal, it does control some 
aspects of online speech through the Protection of Children and Youths Welfare 
and Rights Act (the “Child Protection Act”) and Copyright Act.21 Article 46(1) of 
the Child Protection Act authorizes the administrative agency to develop protective 
systems to prevent children from accessing immoral Internet content.22 This 
includes: building filtering software, tracking minor’ behavior on the Internet, and 
establishing a content grading system.23 Articles 46(2) and (3) require Internet 
platform providers24 to establish self-disciplinary measures to protect children’s 
moral development and restrict the user’s ability to receive or browse the Internet.25 
The Child Protection Act also requires Internet platform providers to remove 
certain content after failing to establish such self-disciplinary measures or if 
informed by the government that certain online content corrupts the minds of 
underage users.26 
Meanwhile, Chapter VI-1 of the Copyright Act provides that online service 
providers (“OSPs”)27 may suspend the accounts of customers; accused of 
downloading copyrighted material more than three times.28 ISPs are responsible for 
removing or denying access to copyright infringing content and alerting customers 
to the infringement by e-mail after copyright holders bring violations to their 
attention.29 
Even though there are only two sources of law that have Internet control 
mechanisms, Taiwan’s Internet control regulations are similar to the United States’ 
                                                          
21 See Child and Youth Welfare Protection Act (Taiwan), promulgated on Aug. 8, 2010, available 
at http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@18:1804289383:f:NO%3DC705125*%20OR%20NO%3DC005125 
%20OR%20NO%3DC105125$$4$$$NO (last visited Apr. 20, 2013); The Copyright Act (Taiwan), 
supra note 15. 
22 Child and Youth Welfare Protection Act (Taiwan), supra note 21. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (stating internet platform providers are defined as entity providing any platform services 
accessible online [e.g., online storage space, online information for building websites, smart card value-
adding service, and web page linkage services]). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See The Copyright Act (Taiwan), supra note 15, at art. 3(19) (stating the OSPs under the 
Copyright Act refer to internet service providers, rapid saving service providers, information saving 
service providers, and searching service providers). 
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government-private partnership model.30 As will be discussed later, this partnership 
model imposes liability on private online intermediaries to help the government to 
filter or block minor-harmed or copyright infringed materials online. 
Only a few Internet speech cases in Taiwan involve the Child Protection Act 
and Copyright Act. Some Taiwanese legislators have suggested that a law 
governing online regulation should be enacted.31 However, no legislation put forth 
has presented a concrete proposal explaining how the Internet should be regulated. 
As Taiwan shops for enhanced Internet regulation, a comparison between different 
Internet control models will help Taiwan find clear and justifiable standards in 
selecting future control measures. 
II. WHAT IS “INTERNET CENSORSHIP”? 
A. The Features of the Internet and Their Constitutional Implications 
Trying to define “Internet” or “cyberspace” is not as instructive as one might 
think.32 It is more enlightening to look at the differences between the physical 
world and cyberspace and determine how the differences affect the formation of 
law in cyberspace.33 
Lawrence Lessig named four critical forces in cyberspace in his book Code 
2.0: the law, social norms, market, and architecture.34 Lessig treats the sum of these 
four constraints as the beginnings of cyberspace regulation, and explores how each 
constraint affects the others.35 The distinctions between the physical world and 
cyberspace are reflected in three of Lessig’s constraints: the social norms, market, 
and architecture. 
                                                          
30 See the U.S. model introduced and analyzed infra Part IV(III). 
31 Jhen Huei-Jhen, The visual world also needs the law in real world, SINA NEWS (Oct. 2009), 
http://news.sina.com.tw/magazine/article/3585-2.html. 
32 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–53 (1997) (introducing the history and 
development of Internet and how it functions). 
33 But see JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF 
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 45–46 (2012) (considering cyberspace is not that different from real space and 
only the experience is changed). 
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1. Social Norms 
Social norms are different in the physical and virtual domains, which can be 
attributed mainly to anonymity in the virtual world.36 For example, in the virtual 
domain, social norms are not imposed on people through mandatory regulatory 
measures like laws; they are instead followed voluntarily for the sake of 
maintaining reputation or out of shame or moral conscience.37 Alternatively, in the 
physical world, when an individual expresses an unethical opinion, that individual 
might suffer moral accusation and reputational harm. Such concerns are diminished 
in cyberspace because the identities of speakers are often hidden.38 Believing they 
can speak with impunity, individuals are less inhibited and are easily tempted to 
lower their moral standards when speaking in cyberspace.39 
In terms of age, the denizens of cyberspace are different from those of the 
physical world. Active Internet users are generally younger, while less frequent 
users tend to be older, poorer, and do not go about their daily business online.40 
While social norms in the physical world are largely shaped by the older 
generation, cyberworld norms are shaped by active online users, often with the 
effect of polarizing online speech.41 
The comparatively lax social norms in the virtual world give the speakers 
greater freedom to exchange their ideas with less regard for self-censorship. There 
is, however, still a price to pay for violation of social norms in cyberspace. 
Violators can be banned from speaking or accessing a certain online forum, a 
punishment that is rare in the physical world for defying social norms.42 
                                                          
36 See Albert Z. Kovacs, Quieting the Virtual Prison Riot: Why the Internet’s Spirit of “Sharing” 
Must Be Broken, 51 DUKE L.J. 753, 757–58 (2001) (illustrates the feature of anonymity in cyberspace). 
37 See Daniel B. Levin, Building Social Norms on the Internet, 4 YALE SYMP. ON L. & TECH. 97, 
102–11 (2001–2002) (discussing different theories of norm development). 
38 See id. at 117. 
39 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.benkler.org/Benkler_Wealth_Of_ 
Networks.pdf (indicating how the enhanced autonomy in cyberspace change the individual’s 
relationship with the others). 
40 See Demographics of Internet Users, PEW INTERNET (Apr. 17–May 29), http://pewinternet.org/ 
Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Whos-Online.aspx (according to the tracking survey done in 2013 by 
Pew Research Center, between 18–29 adults, 98% in the group uses internet, while to whom over 65 
years old, only 56% of them uses internet). 
41 See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 46–96 (2007) (discussing polarization effect of 
online speech). 
42 See infra Part III discussing the selected Internet control models for instances when persons are 
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As Lessig has already pointed out, a different pricing system has emerged in 
cyberspace.43 For example, music is presented as a product that can be bought and 
sold in the physical world, but the same music can be listened to online for free. 
Conversely, books and articles can be read for free in the libraries of the physical 
world, but the same digital content typically cannot be accessed without first 
paying and registering with online database service providers. 
Another difference between the two realms is that most markets in the 
physical world are local, serving consumers or users within a nation’s territory.44 
The lack of borders in cyberspace, and consequently the absence of transboundary 
business costs, means that more service providers aim to serve global users 
online.45 
3. Architecture 
In physical world, architecture regulates behavior automatically without the 
need of enforcement.46 As Lessig has pointed out, there are not many available 
forums for people to make public addresses due to the restriction caused by 
architecture in the physical world.47 Also, in real space, we may erect barriers to 
exclude certain groups’ participation in activities.48 Further, the architecture makes 
it difficult for one to hide in real space.49 
On the other hand, the architecture of the virtual world comprises both 
software and hardware.50 This architecture makes the Internet decentralized, have 
multiple access points, and transcend geographical boundaries—features that led 
Lessig to refer to cyberspace architecture as “First Amendment in cyberspace.”51 
These features eliminate restrictions under the physical world architecture, 
                                                          
43 LESSIG, supra note 6, at 124. 
44 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD? (2008) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH & WU]. 
45 See id. 
46 Levin, supra note 37, at 101. 
47 LESSIG, supra note 6, at 235. 
48 Id. at 86. 
49 Id. at 45. 
50 Id. at 124. 




I N T E R N E T  C O N T R O L  O R  I N T E R N E T  C E N S O R S H I P ?  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










including the impossibility of being invisible and inability to participate.52 Since 
the architecture in cyberspace changes the power structure and serves so 
importantly in protecting freedom of speech, the issue of how to regulate 
cyberspace is therefore one that cannot be overlooked.53 
4. How Should Law in Cyberspace Be Different? 
Besides their different appearances in the virtual and physical worlds, the 
three constraints (social norms, market, architecture) also operate differently in 
various regions of the world. These regional differences—including culture, 
market, and government structure—impact Internet control policy. Take the 
comparison of social norms between China and United States as an example. 
Traditional Chinese social norms do not treat intellectual property rights (“IP 
rights”) as an important issue;54 therefore, China does not use IP rights as a basis to 
regulate the Internet.55 By contrast, United States social norms highly value and 
respect IP rights; consequently, IP rights and serve an important ground in 
controlling Internet activities in the United States.56 Regional differences should be 
borne in mind when judging the nature of Internet control regulations in different 
models.57 
If cyberspace and the physical world are different in terms of social norms, 
market, and architecture, it follows that the laws that bind the physical world may 
not be a good fit for cyberspace. According to Lawrence Lessig, to change any four 
                                                          
52 Id. at 45–46, 86–87. 
53 See id. at 237. 
54 See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, Don’t Stop Thinking About . . . Yesterday: Why There Was no 
Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law in Imperial China, in TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN 
ELEGANT OFFENCE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 9, 16–17 (1995) 
(suggesting that efforts done by tradition Chinese government before 20th century is merely for the 
secure of national power). 
55 Though China does have laws protecting intellectual property rights, the notoriously poor 
implementation of which is often subject to criticism, see, e.g., Martha Magadalena Kleyn, The Role of 
culture in Business Transactions and Protection of Intellectual Property Rights within Asian Countries 
such as China and Japan, 47 LES NOUVELLES 37, 42–43 (2012); Lael S., Ghost Shifts and IP Rights in 
China, INTERNET AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JUSTICE CLINIC OF UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
LAW SCHOOL (May 2011), http://lawblog.usfca.edu/internetjustice/2011/ghost-shifts-and-ip-rights-in-
china/. 
56 Western culture treats property rights, including IP rights, as natural ones. One of the origin of 
IP rights is considered to be from John Locke’s theories, See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 297–300 (1988); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and 
Copyrights, 1989 DUKE. L.J. 1532, 1540 (1989). 
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of the constraints would change the whole regulation.58 Therefore the law 
governing the virtual world should be different. Examining the free flow of 
information online and access to the Internet as a human right will help determine 
whether to expand or limit the scope of the law of the physical world when 
applying it to cyberspace. 
a. Free flow of information in cyberspace 
The free flow of information is an important interest and human right. Many 
international human rights treaties recognize the importance and borderless nature 
of freely flowing information.59 Article 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) reads: “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom 
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”60 
Free flow of information is partly achieved by Article 19.2’s language, “to 
seek, receive, and impart information[,]” and thus should be recognized as freedom 
of speech under the ICCPR. Additionally, the language “through any other media” 
qualifies free flow of information online as a freedom protected by Article 19.2. 
In General Comment 34, the United Nations (“UN”) Human Rights 
Committee (the “Committee”) interprets Article 19.2 as “[embracing] a right of 
access to information held by public bodies[.]”61 This requires the government to 
“proactively put in the public domain Government information of public interest” 
and “make every effort to ensure easy, prompt, effective and practical access to 
such information.”62 Besides the right to access online information of the 
government, the Committee also stressed in General Comment No. 25 that it is 
essential for citizens to exchange information and ideas about public and political 
                                                          
58 LESSIG, supra note 6, at 123. 
59 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Session, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
60 ICCPR, supra note 59. A similar provision can be found in Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), which reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, supra note 59. 
61 U.N. GAOR Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess., ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011). 
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affairs.63 Such free communication “implies a free press and other media able to 
comment on public issues and to inform public opinion without censorship or 
restraint.”64 The foregoing suggests that the Committee believes censorship refers 
directly to an illegitimate government restriction on free speech. 
Though Taiwan is not a signatory to the ICCPR, Taiwan’s Congress approved 
both the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (the “ICSCR”) on March 31, 2009.65 Taiwan subsequently passed and 
promulgated the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(the “Act”).66 Republic of China (R.O.C.) President Ma Ying-jeou officially signed 
the ICCPR and the ICSCR on May 14, 2009, and the acts were given force on 
December 10, 2009.67 The ICCPR and its General Comments are recognized in 
Taiwan as domestic law and may guide the interpretation of the Constitution.68 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has expanded on the free flow of 
information in many cases, underscoring the importance of protecting free 
speech.69 Scholars Jonathan Penney, Achal Mehra, Marci Hamilton and Clemens 
Kohnen have discussed the free flow of information as an independent right.70 The 
                                                          
63 Human Rights Comm., General Comment 25, The right to participate in public affairs, voting 
rights and the right of equal access to public service, 57th Sess., ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (July 12, 1996). 
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 MA YING-JOEU, Foreword by the ROC President, in CORE DOCUMENT FORMING PART OF THE 
REPORTS REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) I–II (Sept. 2012), retrieved from Initial State Reports on 
ICCPR & ICESCR, RESPECT, PROTECT & FULFILL HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 24, 2012), http:// 
www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=285670&ctNode=33254&mp=205. 
66 The Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Taiwan), promulgated on Apr. 22, 
2009, available at http://www.humanrights.moj.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=32913&CtUnit=12352& 
BaseDSD=7&mp=200 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter The Act]. 
67 Id. 
68 See Nigel N. T. Li, Joyce W. J. Chen & Jeffrey Li, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Applying Article 
16 of the ICCPR to End Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES (Peter 
Hodgkinson ed., forthcoming Dec. 2013). 
69 See, e.g., Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (free flow of information is 
fundamental public welfare element under First Amendment); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 
(1974) (freedom of express includes free flow of information of public figure as most important public 
interest); 44 Liquomart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) (text and free flow of 
information under First Amendment shows that regulating speech is more dangerous than regulating 
conduct). 
70 See, e.g., Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins, 
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (2011) (suggesting that the free flow of information should be treated as 
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U.S. Supreme Court has not yet directly recognized the interest of the free flow of 
information in cyberspace. However, the Taiwan Constitutional Tribunal (the 
“TCT”) has tentatively weighed in on the subject in two interpretations. In the 
reasoning for Interpretation No. 613, the TCT stated: 
The freedom of speech as guaranteed by Article 11 of the Constitution embodies 
the freedom of communication, namely, the freedom to operate or utilize 
broadcasting, television and other communications and mass media networks to 
obtain information and publish speeches. Communications and mass media are 
the means and platforms by which public opinions are formed. . . . In light of the 
said functions of mass media, the freedom of communication not only signifies 
the passive prevention of infringement by the state’s public authority, but also 
imposes on the legislators the duty to actively devise various organizations, 
procedures and substantive norms so as to prevent information monopoly and 
ensure that pluralistic views and opinions of society can be expressed and 
distributed via the platforms of communications and mass media, thus creating a 
free forum for public discussion.71 
The TCT opined in Interpretation No. 613 that the freedom of communication 
required the government to prevent the infringement of such freedom but did not 
give standards for judicial review.72 The TCT reiterated its position in 
Interpretation No. 678: 
The safeguard of freedom of speech as such also includes the protection of the 
freedom of communication and broadcasting, that is, the people’s freedom to 
access information and express opinions through radio broadcasting, television 
or other means of communication or networks (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 613). 
However, the constitutional safeguard over the freedom of speech and the 
methods of communication is not absolute; varying protection mechanisms and 
                                                                                                                                      
(1986) (proposing the notion of international free flow of information and suggesting that the U.S. 
should abolish the distinction between domestic and international communications); Marci A. Hamilton 
& Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the 
Pathways of Information, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 267 (2003) (proposing three types of free flow of 
information from people to government, government to people, and between private parties). 
71 No. 613 Interpretation, Taiwan Judicial Yuen Constitutional Tribunal Interpretation (July 21, 
2006), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=613. 
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guidelines whose application depend on the content of the speech at issue should 
be created.73 
The TCT also referenced R.O.C. Constitution Article 2374 for reviewing 
whether the restriction on freedom of communication is justified.75 Though the 
TCT did not discuss the considerations in weighing and balancing the free flow of 
information with the other interests, it recognized the free flow of information in 
cyberspace as a part of the constitutional freedom of speech in Taiwan.76 
In the physical world, the need to treat the free flow of information as an 
independent interest different from the freedom of speech may not be apparent. 
However, in cyberspace, information can traverse far greater distances and at far 
greater speed.77 By the very nature of the Internet, Internet users can receive and 
disseminate more information and do it nearly instantly. The interest of the people 
in the free flow of information online is thus enhanced. Moreover, everyone online 
can enjoy free flow of information, not just certain groups of a country’s citizens, 
unless the country has imposed harsh Internet censorship measures.78 When any 
local government desires to impose restrictions on the free flow of information in 
cyberspace in the name of local interests, it should remember that it is interfering 
with world interests and rights and therefore should design the measures 
necessarily. 
                                                          
73 No. 678 Interpretation, Taiwan Judicial Yuen Constitutional Tribunal Interpretation (July 2, 
2010), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=678. 
74 Article 23 of R.O.C. Constitution reads: “All the freedoms and rights enumerated in the 
preceding Articles shall not be restricted by law except such as may be necessary to prevent 
infringement upon the freedoms of other persons, to avert an imminent crisis, to maintain social order or 
to advance public welfare.” JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL YUAN, R.O.C., 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p07_2.asp?lawno=36 (last visited: Nov. 3, 2013). 
75 No. 678 Interpretation, Taiwan Judicial Yuen Constitutional Tribunal Interpretation (July 2, 
2010), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=678. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., April Mara Major, Norm Origin and Development in Cyberspace: Models of 
Cybernorm Evolution, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 97–103 (2000); Patrick O’Neil, Optimizing and Retricting 
the Flow of Information: Remodeling the first Amendment for a Convergent World, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1057, 1070–72 (1994); Levin, supra note 37, at 115–21. 
78 See Ingrid Volmer, Universalism and Particularism: The Problem of Cultural Sovereignty and 
Global information Flow, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 78–79 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (pointing out the 
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The United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) also pointed out the special 
consideration and interest in preserving the flow of information online in one of its 
reports on May 16, 2011: 
The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that there should be as little restriction as 
possible to the flow of information via the Internet, except in few, exceptional, 
and limited circumstances prescribed by international human rights law. He also 
stresses that the full guarantee of the right to freedom of expression must be the 
norm, and any limitation considered an exception, and that this principle should 
never be reversed.79 
b. Access to the Internet as a Human Right 
The differences between the physical world and cyberspace in terms of the 
social norms, market, and architecture show that access to space or gate control 
matters more in cyberspace rather than in the physical world.80 The architecture of 
the virtual world creates barriers for users, thereby affecting the online community 
differently, and shaping the social norms differently.81 At the same time, the online 
pricing system functions on the power to control access.82 
Whether access to the Internet should be designated as a human right is still 
controversial. Vinton Cerf, an opponent to the Internet being recognized as a 
human right, argues, “technology is an enabler of rights, not a right itself.”83 He 
believes that technology has failed to meet the “high bar” of being considered as a 
human right because the right to make a living, access information, or speak freely 
is not necessarily coupled to technology.84 Conversely, advocates for recognizing 
Internet access as a human right argue that Articles 19 and 27 of the UDHR85 
                                                          
79 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and Challenges to the Right of all 
Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and Ideas of all Kinds Through the Internet, 
Human Rights Council, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011). 
80 See supra Part II discussing differences between physical world and cyberspace in terms of 
societal norms, market, and architecture. 
81 LESSIG, supra note 6, at 124. 
82 Id. 
83 Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Access Is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/opinion/internet-access-is-not-a-human-right.html?_r=2&ref=opinion&. 
84 Id. (stating that even if the Internet is necessary to realize human rights, and thus should be 
guaranteed now, it should be viewed as a means, not as an end, or a “right,” in itself). 
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already provide the basis for treating access to the Internet as a human right. 
Specifically advocates argue such access should not be an isolated right, but rather 
inseparable from the right to association and expression.86 One such advocate, 
Sherif Elsayed-Ali, disagrees with Cerf, arguing that access to the Internet has 
become and will continue to be “an essential component of the rights to freedom of 
expression and access to information” in the foreseeable future and should be 
available to everyone, similar to education.87 
In the physical world, everyone is born into the world and the only exit is 
death. In cyberspace, whoever controls Internet access reigns supreme. Thus, 
access to the Internet should be a human right granted to everyone. Doing so would 
preclude arbitrary and tyrannical control of the online gateway. Furthermore, as 
more and more information in the physical world is digitized and uploaded, the 
ability to access the Internet will gradually reflect the ability to acquire basic 
information or knowledge about the world. Access to cyberspace is therefore as 
important as education, and equal access to the Internet should be protected just the 
same.88 
As discussed above, Article 19 of the ICCPR and the Committee’s General 
Comment No. 34 recognize the right for people to access public information as a 
basic and important human right.89 Because the ability to access the Internet will 
gradually become a measure of the ability to access information, it should rightly 
be deemed an independent human right under Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
Article 19 of the ICCPR and the Committee’s General Comment No. 34 may 
also be the reason why, in July 2012, the UN Human Rights Council passed a 
resolution widely considered to recognize access to the Internet as a human right.90 
The resolution first confirms that the rights people have offline should also be 
protected online notwithstanding frontiers, especially the freedom of expression 
                                                          
86 Cerf, supra note 83. 
87 Sherif Elsayed-Ali, Internet Access Is Integral to Human Rights, EGYPT INDEP. LIVE BLOG 
(Jan. 15, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/internet-access-integral-human-
rights. 
88 See id. 
89 See infra Part II–I (4)(1) (discussing Article 19 of the ICCPR and General Comment No. 34). 
90 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, U.N. Affirms Internet Freedom as a Basic Right, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 6, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/so-the-united-nations-affirms-internet-freedom-
as-a-basic-right-now-what/; see also Alex Fitzpatrick, Internet Access Is a Human Right, Says United 
Nations, MASHABLE (July 6, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/06/internet-human-right/; Talia Ralph, 
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under the ICCPR Article 19.91 The resolution thereby “[c]alls upon all States to 
promote and facilitate access to the Internet and international cooperation aimed at 
the development of media and information and communications facilities in all 
countries.”92 
Due to the free flow of information interest in cyberspace and recognition of 
access to the Internet as a human right, the restriction on Internet activities would 
have to be subject to cautious constitutional examination in order to acquire 
justifiability. Avoiding Internet censorship is therefore the priority concern of 
governmental measures controlling the Internet. The danger and meaning of 
censorship is analyzed in the next section. 
B. The Meaning and Danger of Censorship 
Before exploring issues of Internet censorship, it is necessary to understand 
what censorship means in the context of this discourse. The first step toward 
defining censorship is determining whether it is a negative or neutral term.93 
Eli Pariser describes censorship as “a process by which government alters 
facts and content,” and thinks such a concept is inherently negative.94 P.G. Ingram, 
meanwhile, suggests that censorship denotes the restrictive policy governing 
publication, public performance, and exhibition.95 As is such, “censorship is only 
one limitation of liberty,” which does not necessarily constitute repression, and is 
therefore merely a neutral term.96 
                                                          
91 Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 20th Sess., June 18–July 
6, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/8/ at ¶ 1 (June 29, 2012). 
92 Id. at ¶ 3. 
93 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031, 1042 (6th ed. 1991), which defines the word “negative” 
as “a denial; a proposition by which something is denied, a statement in the form of denial.” “Neutral” is 
defined as “indifferent, unbiased, impartial; not engaged on either side; not taking an active part with 
either of the contending sides.” If censorship is a negative term, it means censorship is not acceptable 
and denial. By contrast, if censorship is a neutral term, then it means it is simply an unbiased description 
of restrictive measure of the government. 
94 ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW PERSONALIZED WEB IS CHANGING WHAT 
WE READ AND HOW WE THINK 140–41 (2011); see Salman Rushdie & Jonathan Rauch, Censorship is 
Harmful, in CENSORSHIP: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 26 (David Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1997) 
(referring censorship as eroding First Amendment’s value). 
95 P.G. INGRAM, CENSORSHIP AND FREE SPEECH: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL BEARINGS 1–4 (2000); 
see also Thomas Storck, Censorship can be Beneficial, in CENSORSHIP: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 17, 18 
(David Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1997) (defining censorship as “the restriction, absolute[ly] or 
merely to some part of the population . . . by the proper political authorities, of intellectual, literacy, or 
artistic material in any format”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court seems to treat censorship as a negative term rather 
than a neutral one. In Near v. Minnesota (1931), the statute at issue prohibited a 
newspaper owner or publisher from publishing scandalous and defamatory 
material.97 The Court determined that prohibiting the activity without providing the 
publisher an opportunity to verify the content as true had an “essence of 
censorship.”98 The Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional restraint upon 
liberty of the press as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 The Court also 
noted that the freedom of the press had historically been treated by the Constitution 
to mean “immunity from previous restraints or censorship.”100 The Court appeared 
to treat censorship as synonymous to illegitimate restraints that muffle the press 
and publication and found censorship undesirable under the United States 
Constitution. 
Censorship, then, is a governmental effort to suppress certain contents of 
speech or publications, regardless of whether they have an actual negative effect on 
individuals or the public. The risk of censorship, as indicated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Cohen v. California (1971), is that the “governments might soon seize 
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views.”101 Governmental censorship against a specific 
speaker may inevitably create self-censorship, and self-censorship may create a 
chilling effect, inducing mass censorship.102 
If the government could arbitrarily examine the contents of speech and 
prohibit publication or expression, combined with self-censorship, the chilling 
effect may become a reality. This undesirable reality would diminish the goal that 
“[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open[,]”103and 
create a real threat to the democratic value of freedom of expression.104 Censorship 
or self-censorship should therefore be averted.105 
                                                          
97 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
98 Id. at 713. 
99 Id. at 723. 
100 Id. at 716. 
101 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 
(1982). 
102 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1964) (quoting Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1959)). 
103 Id. at 270. 
104 See Svetlana Mintcheva, The Censor Within, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY 
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In the physical world, when the government prohibits certain contents of 
speech, the government’s enforcement of the prohibition causes people to refrain 
from disseminating such contents for fear of being penalized.106 In cyberspace, the 
pervasive anonymity of the Internet means that mere criminalization of 
dissemination of forbidden information is not enough to stop certain speech.107 
Measures such as blocking or filtering must be applied to enforce the law, which 
may explain why Internet censorship is often seen as a synonym of Internet 
filtering, when access to information online is controlled or denied.108 
What constitutes illegitimate control or censorship is another critical question. 
In the United States, whether a measure to prohibit expression is legitimate 
depends on the legal grounds and the appropriateness of the measure; that is, 
whether it passes the necessity test109 under Article 19.3 of ICCPR, which requires 
the measure to be appropriately achieving the goals, to be the least restrictive mean, 
and to be proportionate.110 When discussing Internet censorship issues in the 
context of international human rights, should the standard remain the same? The 
next section explores international grounds and limitations for Internet control, and 
attempts to carve out clear guidance. 
C. The ICCPR Standards to Determine Legitimate Internet Control 
Article 19.3 of the ICCPR provides three legitimate grounds for regulating 
freedom of expression. 
The exercise of the [freedom of expression] rights provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary: (1) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (2) For 
                                                                                                                                      
the idea that censorship, including self-censorship, threatens freedom of expression. “Self-repression 
often derives from fear . . . This fear threatens creative activity . . . .”). 
105 See Storck, supra note 95, at 17–18. 
106 See id. See also INGRAM, supra note 95. 
107 LACEY ALFORD, THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA: AN EVALUATION OF INTERNET 
CENSORSHIP IN CHINA 5 (2010); see Robert Faris et al., Censorship 2.0, 3 INNOVATIONS 165–87 (2008). 
108 ALFORD, supra note 107; Faris, et al., supra note 107. 
109 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN 
AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 53–66 (2009). 
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the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public 
health or morals.111 
To determine what constitutes a legitimate ground to restrict freedom of 
expression, the Committee clarifies that “[s]tates parties should put in place 
effective measures to protect against attacks aimed at silencing those exercising 
their right to freedom of expression” and Article 19.3 “may never be invoked as a 
justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, 
democratic tenets and human rights.”112 The Committee’s position that mere 
advocacy of an idea or thoughts may not constitute a justification for the 
government to regulate speech coincides with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).113 This holding reflects the principle that the State 
cannot “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except 
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action 
and is likely to incite or produce such action.”114 
Article 19.3’s three legitimate grounds for regulating speech are themselves 
limited restrictions.115 What the respect of others’ rights and reputations or public 
health encompasses is clearer than the protection of national security, public order, 
and public morals. In General Comment 34 the Committee defined national 
security, public order, and public morals under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR as 
narrow and limited authorizations: 
30. Extreme care must be taken by States parties to ensure that treason laws and 
similar provisions relating to national security, whether described as official 
secrets or sedition laws or otherwise, are crafted and applied in a manner that 
conforms to the strict requirements of paragraph 3. It is not compatible with 
paragraph 3, for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress or withhold from the 
public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national 
security or to prosecute journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human 
rights defenders, or others, for having disseminated such information . . . . 31. 
On the basis of maintenance of public order (order public) it may, for instance, 
be permissible in certain circumstances to regulate speech-making in a particular 
public place . . . . 32. The Committee observed in general comment No. 22, that 
                                                          
111 ICCPR, supra note 59, at art. 19, ¶ 3. 
112 Id. at art. 19 general cmt. 34, ¶ 22. 
113 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
114 Id. 
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“the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious 
traditions; consequently, limitations . . . for the purpose of protecting morals 
must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.” 
Any such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of human 
rights and the principle of non-discrimination.116 
Even if the reason emphasized in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR117 can be cited to 
limit the freedom of expression, the means adopted by the government to restrict 
the rights guaranteed by Article 19.1 and 19.2 must pass Article 19.3’s necessity 
test:118 the restrictions “shall only be such as are provided by law and are 
necessary.”119 The Committee interprets the necessity test as requiring the 
restrictive measures to “be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they 
must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their 
protective function; they must be proportionate to the interest to be protected.”120 
When reviewing the necessity test, the form and means of expression must be taken 
into account and “the value placed by the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is 
particularly high in the circumstances of public debate in a democratic society 
concerning figures in the public and political domain.”121 
The Committee stated that “[t]he penalization of a media outlet, publishers or 
journalist solely for being critical of the government or the political social system 
espoused by the government can never be considered to be a necessary restriction 
of freedom of expression.”122 The Committee further pointed out that any 
restrictions on the Internet-based information dissemination system and the systems 
to support such a system should be compatible with Article 19.3, according to 
which the “[p]ermissible restrictions generally should be content-specific” and 
“generic bans on the operation of certain sites and systems are not allowed.”123 
                                                          
116 Id. at ¶¶ 30, 32. 
117 Article 19.1 reads: “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.” 
ICCPR, supra note 59, at art. 19.1. 
118 Id. at art. 19, ¶ 22 (“Paragraph 3 lays down specific conditions and it is only subject to these 
conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions must be “provided by law”; they may only 
be imposed for one of the grounds set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must 
conform to the strict tests of necessity and proportionality.”). 
119 Id. at art. 19.3 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. at art. 12 general cmt. 27, ¶ 14, Sept. 12, 2011. 
121 Id. at art. 12, ¶ 34. 
122 Id. at ¶ 42. 
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Furthermore, “to prohibit a site or information dissemination system from 
publishing material solely on the basis that it may be critical of the government or 
the political social system espoused by the government” is also not permissible 
under Article 19.3.124 
With an understanding of the international human rights standards on 
restricting the free flow of information in cyberspace, a comparison and analysis of 
the different Internet control models is now possible and will be explored in Part 
III. 
III. THREE INTERNET CONTROL MODELS 
In this section, the Internet control models of China, Singapore, and the 
United States will be examined to determine whether the models constitute 
legitimate restrictions on the freedom of speech under international human rights 
law or whether they should be deemed Internet censorship. The examination of 
these models will also provide guidance to Taiwan for its Internet control model 
selection. 
A. China—Internet Control Through Wide Blocking and Filtering  
To the rest of the world, China conducts Internet censorship.125 But is this 
perception of China justified? 
On December 28, 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress of China issued the Decision on Strengthening the Protection of Online 
Information (the “Decision”) to require Internet users to provide their real names to 
ISPs before using their online pseudonyms.126 Besides paragraph 6 of the Decision, 
which requires ISPs to collect the real names of Internet users, paragraph 5 makes 
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., Christopher Stevenson, Breaching the Great Firewall: China’s Internet Censorship 
and the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 531, 
534 (2007) (considering China is by no means the only country censoring internet content); James 
Fallows, China’s Internet Censorship is Effective, in CENSORSHIP: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 113 (Scott 
Barbour 2010) (considering China as the most censorious country in the world); Jessica E. Bauml, It’s a 
Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 607, 704 (deeming China to have the “world’s most advanced and sophisticated system of 
censorship”). 
126 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Toughens Its Restrictions on Use of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/china-toughens-restrictions-on-
internet-use.html?hp&_r=2&; Will Morrow, Chinese government imposes new Internet censorship law, 
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ISPs responsible for filtering and censoring illegal online speech.127 Some reports 
have concluded that the Decision represents the Chinese government’s attempt to 
further tighten its grip on the Internet following the attempt by Chinese Internet 
users to expose a string of financial and sexual scandals that have caused at least 
ten local officials to resign or be dismissed.128 
The Decision undoubtedly is intended to pull back the veil of anonymity in 
cyberspace so the government can identify the online speakers and stomp out 
“undesirable” online speech or information dissemination.129 The consequence of 
this measure is a dampening of the active Chinese blogosphere because it forces 
speakers to censor themselves.130 Moreover, the Decision likely does not pass 
Article 19.3’s necessity test since it could be challenged as not using the least 
restrictive means.131 For this reason, the Decision is not legitimate in the context of 
international human rights and thus constitutes Internet censorship. 
                                                          
127 The Decision on Strengthening the Protection of Online Information, XINHUA NEWS (Dec. 28, 
2012, 15:42:04), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/28/c_114195221.htm. 
128 Bradsher, supra note 126; see also The online real name system built by China draws 
attention, BBC CHINESE WEB SITE (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_ 
news/2012/12/121228_china_internet_control.shtml. 
129 See, e.g., King-wa Fu, Chung-hong Chan & Michael Chau, Assessing Censorship on 
Microblogs in China: Discriminatory Keyword Analysis and the Real-Name Registration Policy, 17 
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 42, 46 (2013) (“There has been widespread concern that the true identity 
disclosure policy would have created a chilling effect on online comments, especially on political 
criticism and sensitive topics.”); Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-
Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 
878–79 (2013) (“China’s policy is an example of a real-name policy targeting dissidents, but not 
civility.”); China: Renewed Restrictions Send Online Chill, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 4, 2013), 
http:// www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/04/china-renewed-restrictions-send-online-chill (Considering the 
decision having “a chilling message to China’s netizens,” and “[t]he government’s decision is an effort 
to silence critics and curb anonymity online by further conscripting internet companies to monitor and 
censor users.”) 
130 See Part II(2) supra discussing self-censorship. 
131 See supra Part II discussing the ICCPR standards to determine legitimate Internet control. 
South Korean had a similar online real name system like China, the identity verification scheme, which 
is held unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Korea. One of main reasons adopted by the 
Constitutional Court is that the identity verification scheme is not a less-restrictive mean: “ . . . identity 
verification of the penetrator uploading that illegal information can be substantially conducted by 
tracing or confirming internet addresses. In addition, remedy for victims can also be fully obtained by 
blocking distribution or diffusion of illegal information—deletion or taking temporary measures in 
terms of illegal information by service provider (Article 44-2 Section 1 and 2 of the Information 
Communications Network Act) or denial, suspension or making temporary restriction on handling 
illegal information against message board manager or operator (Article 44-7 Section 2 and 3 of the 
Information Communications Network Act)—or post-crime compensation or criminal punishment.” 
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The Decision is not the first time the Chinese government has tried to regulate 
online speech and order, nor is it the only Internet censorship measure the 
government has ever adopted.132 The Internet control system in China can be 
understood both by the legal basis it invokes and by how the legal basis is carried 
out. 
1. The Legal Grounds for the Government to Control Internet Speech 
The Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (“MMIIS”) 
provides extensive legal grounds for the Chinese government to forbid private 
Internet Information Service Providers (“IISPs) to produce, reproduce, release, or 
disseminate online information.133 They include: national security, state interest and 
honor, national unity or ethnic discrimination, state policy towards religion, social 
order, the regulation of pornography, gambling, violence, homicide, terrorism, 
human dignity, and rights infringement.134 These grounds seem to be derived from 
the grounds for prohibiting dissemination of verboten information, which can be 
found in Article 5 of the Rules of Managing and Protecting Security for Computer 
Information Network and Internet, promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security on December 30, 1997.135 
The IISPs are obliged to censor the content of dubious online speech to stop 
the transmission of illegal online information and immediately record and report as 
required by Article 16 of the MMIIS.136 According to Article 23, failure of 
commercial IISPs to censor dubious online speech will cost them their license; for 
noncommercial IISPs, their websites may be shut down.137 
China is not the only country that requires private IISPs or online service 
providers to help patrol and regulate Internet speech.138 Democratic countries like 
                                                          
132 See Bradsher, supra note 126 (stating besides the following internet censorship measures of 
China the article is going to introduce and analyze, there are other many censorship efforts done by the 
Chinese government. For instance, the government purposefully begins their blocking of the foreign 
famous media websites (e.g., The New York Times and BBC) in 2008 based on the reason that the 
government may not have sufficient techniques to review the contents on those websites). 
133 See Measures for Managing Internet Information Services, CHINA CULTURE, http:// 
www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_23369.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
134 Id. 
135 See The Rules of Managing and Protecting Security for Computer Information Network and 
Internet, THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Dec. 30, 1997) (in 
Chinese), http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3493/n3823/n442104/452202.html. 
136 Measures for Managing Internet Information Services, supra note 133. 
137 Id. 
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the United States also use many different measures to compel ISPs to censor online 
speech in various situations.139 The critical difference between the Chinese model 
and the United States model is this: the Chinese legal basis for controlling the 
Internet is vague and general, while the United States’ is specific and narrow.140 
Of the Chinese government’s grounds for assigning private IISPs 
responsibility to censor Internet speech,141 national unity, state honor, and social 
order are relatively abstract and overbroad. This unjustifiably expands the 
restrictive grounds recognized by Article 19.3 of the ICCPR.142 For instance, 
invoking state policy towards religion to justify suppression of online speech 
contradicts Article 18.1 of the ICCPR, which protects the freedom of religion.143 
For the above reasons, China’s Internet control is appropriately perceived as 
Internet censorship, and it reinforces its system with the so-called Great Firewall of 
China. 
2. China’s Great Firewall and License System 
By threatening to take away operating licenses and assigning IISPs the 
responsibility to report “aberrant” online speech or behavior, the Chinese 
government forces the IISPs to do the government’s bidding to control the 
Internet.144 The government is able to enforce this because of the consequences of 
operating without a license, which would mean forced website closures and fines 
for the IISPs.145 
The Great Firewall of China consists of blocking and content filtering 
techniques.146 The blocking system comprises Domain Name System (“DNS”) 
                                                          
139 Id. 
140 See accompanying text and infra Part III (III) discussing the U.S. model. 
141 See discussion infra for complete list of grounds. 
142 See infra Part II. 
143 ICCPR, supra note 59, at art. 18, ¶ 1 (providing that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”). 
144 See China, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 9, 2012), https://opennet.net/research/profiles/china-
including-hong-kong#footnoteref77_ukdt84a; Bauml, supra note 125, at 705. 
145 Cynthia Liu, Internet Censorship as a Trade Barrier: A Look at the WTO Consistency of the 
Great Firewall in the Wake of the China-Google Dispute, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1199, 1210–11 (2011). 
146 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 14, at 34–40; GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 44, at 87–104; 
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blocking and Uniform Resource Location (“URL”) keyword block.147 With regards 
to the blocking system, China’s government creates a list of IP addresses to block 
and if a webpage’s domain name is on the list, the DNS will turn down a user’s 
request to access the IP address.148 Users attempting to access the IP address will 
see the message “site not found error” on their screens.149 As to the URL keyword 
block, the government monitors forbidden words in URLs and blocks the 
prohibited links.150 DNS establishes a blacklist of words and conducts Internet 
monitoring.151 If a webpage contains words from the blacklist, the page will be off 
limits to the general public.152 
Basically, the Great Firewall is a powerful Internet regulation apparatus 
erected by the Chinese government that selectively blocks website operators and 
Internet users. While the preceding discussion establishes that the basis for the 
Chinese’s Internet control is illegitimate, does the blocking system, which forces 
ISPs to report “questionable” online behavior by threatening to take away their 
operating licenses, pass the necessity test under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR? 
China’s licensing, blocking and filtering system fails the necessity test, and is 
aptly perceived as Internet censorship, simply because it is not designed to be 
“content-specific” as required by the ICCPR Article 19.3. Instead, it provides a 
general clamp on online activities that works to maintain the Chinese authoritarian 
regime by “clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in evidence 
or expected.”153 
However, what if the measures were content-specific and recognized by the 
ICCPR Article 19.3, such as to eradicate online child pornography? Would the 
filtering, blocking and licensing scheme pass the test under Article 19.3 of ICCPR 
                                                          
147 See MACKINNON, supra note 14; see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 44; DELBERT ET. 
AL., supra note 2. 
148 James Fallows, The Connection Has Been Reset, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2008, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-the-connection-has-been-reset/306650/; China: 
The Art of Censorship, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2010/10/china-the-
art-of-censorship/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. 
153 Gary King, Jennifer Pan & Margaret E. Roberts, How Censorship in China Allows 
Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, 107 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 
1, 1 (2013). It shall be noted, however, that the authors also point out that “the purpose of the censorship 
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in that case?154 An investigation into the Singapore and United States models 
shows how governmental measures pass or fail Article 19.3’s test. 
B. Singapore—Internet Control Model Based on Licensing System 
Unlike China’s direct Internet control through blocking and content filtering, 
Singapore’s “class license” scheme indirectly controls the Internet.155 Under the 
Broadcasting Class License Notification of Broadcasting Act of Singapore (the 
“Act”), both Internet content providers (“ICPs”), who provide programs on the 
World Wide Web through the Internet, and ISPs are subject to the class license 
scheme.156 Most of the ICPs and ISPs are automatically class licensed upon their 
establishment.157 However, some groups are required to register within fourteen 
days of the commencement of their operations, or when notified by the 
government.158 These groups include: religious groups, political groups, news 
groups, Internet cafes, schools, and public libraries.159 
The class licensed ICPs and ISPs are obligated to comply with the 
Singaporean Internet Code of Practice (the “Code”), though failure to comply will 
trigger no sanctions from the government.160 Both ICPS and ISPs are required to 
deny access to sites containing materials banned by the Code.161 ISPs should 
refrain from subscribing to any newsgroup if they believe the newsgroup contains 
prohibited materials and unsubscribe from any newsgroup by the orders of the 
authorities.162 ICPs should ensure that there is no Code-prohibited material on their 
programs and deny access to materials prohibited by the government authorities.163 
                                                          
154 DELBERT ET AL., supra note 147. 
155 See, e.g., Lewis S. Malakoff, Are You My Mommy, or My Big Brother? Comparing Internet 
Censorship in Singapore and the U.S., 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 423, 427–33 (1999); Sarah B. Hogan, 
Note, To Net or Not to Net: Singapore’s Regulation of the Internet, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 429, 446 
(1999). 
156 Paragraph 2 and 3 of the Broadcasting Class License Notification of Broadcasting Act, 
Chapter 28 Section 9, N 1 G.N. No. S 306/1996 REVISED EDITION 2004 (Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter 
The Broadcasting Act]. 
157 Id. at ¶ 4. See also Internet Service & Content Provider Class License, MEDIA DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY, http://www.mda.gov.sg/Licences/Pages/IntSCPCLicence.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
158 The Broadcasting Act, supra note 156, at ¶ 4. 
159 Id. 
160 The Schedule of the Broadcasting Act: Internet Code of Practice, ¶ 1(2) (listing the various 
penalties for violating the code). 
161 Id. at ¶ 3(1) & 4. 
162 Id. at ¶ 3(1) & (2). 
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Paragraph 4(1) of the Code defines “prohibited material” as “material that is 
objectionable on the grounds of public interest, public morality, public order, 
public security, national harmony, or is otherwise prohibited by applicable 
Singapore laws.”164 To flesh out the abstract grounds, the Code also lists factors 
that should be considered in determining whether certain material is prohibited, 
including nudity, sexual violence, explicit sexual activity, child pornography, 
homosexuality, extreme violence, and ethnic, racial, and religious hatred.165 
The grounds for the Singaporean government to ask the ICPs or ISPs to 
regulate Internet speech content are consistent with the grounds under Article 19.3 
of the ICCPR.166 Most of the considerations listed in paragraph 4(3) of the Code 
concern obscenity, violence, child pornography, or hate speech.167 These areas are 
similarly restricted and content-specific under the ICCPR standard. Therefore, 
whether the Singaporean online control constitutes censorship comes down to the 
class license scheme and the power vested in ICPs and ISPs to block access to 
cyberspace. 
The Committee indicated in General Comment No. 34 that “[r]egulatory 
systems should take into account the differences between the print and broadcast 
sectors and the Internet, while also noting the manner in which various media 
converge.”168 Comment 34 further explained the conditions for subjecting the 
broadcast media to the licensing system: “States parties must avoid imposing 
onerous licensing conditions and fees on the broadcast media, including on 
community and commercial stations. The criteria for the application of such 
conditions and license fees should be reasonable and objective, clear, transparent, 
nondiscriminatory and otherwise in compliance with the Covenant.”169 
Based on these statements, the Committee seems to recognize that the Internet 
is different from the traditional print and broadcast media, and that it facilitates the 
convergence of various media. As a result, to claim that bandwidth is limited to 
justify regulation of the Internet through the license system is not a potentially 
possible argument. Even if the license system for the Internet is considered 
legitimate under the ICCPR Article 19, it must at least comply with the limitations 
imposed by the Committee on the broadcast media license system—that is, the 
                                                          
164 Id. at ¶ 4(1). 
165 Id. at ¶ 4(2). 
166 See Initial State Reports on ICCPR & ICESCR, supra note 65. 
167 See The Schedule of the Broadcasting Act: Internet Code of Practice, supra note 160, at ¶ 4(3). 
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criteria for the license should be reasonable, objective, clear, transparent, and 
nondiscriminatory.170 
As Lewis S. Malokoff observed, the enforcement of the Code is lagging 
because the class license scheme does not include any ban or sanctions, and thus 
serves merely as a symbolic regulation.171 Although the government keeps a 
blacklist of operators, those on the blacklist can easily evade detection by changing 
their addresses and go on to operate similar websites.172 The Singaporean practice 
is toothless. The operators’ class licenses are like birthrights; they are mostly given 
upon establishment or are easily obtained by a rubberstamping registration 
authority and cannot be revoked.173 Further, there are not enough government 
personnel on hand to monitor the compliance of the ICPs or the ISPs.174 If the 
Singaporean government declares that it owns or controls the Internet, it does so 
only nominally. If the Singaporean government threatened to revoke the class 
license, the system would produce better results. 
However, it is illegitimate for a government to declare, whether de facto or de 
jure, that the Internet resources are exclusive and that citizens need to secure the 
governments permission before using the it. The scheme of “inalienable” class 
licenses is married by such unjustifiable implications. Furthermore, if the 
Singaporean government used licensing as a condition (i.e., to repeal the license or 
shut down the websites) to force the ICPs or ISPs to censor certain online speech, 
such a regime could be considered as not applying the least restrictive means as 
compared with fines or suspension of the license. 
C. United States—Internet Control Through Government-Private 
Partnership 
The grounds for the United States to specifically design a set of means or 
system to control Internet speech may be summarized to include national security, 
child protection, and copyright.175 The United States’ government-private 
partnership system requires private ISPs or ICPs to cooperate with the government 
                                                          
170 Id. 
171 Malakoff, supra note 155, at 443–46. 
172 Hogan, supra note 155, at 446. 
173 See id. at 446–47. 
174 Id. 
175 See CHRISTINE ZUCHORA-WALSKE, INTERNET CENSORSHIP: PROTECTING CITIZENS OR 
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to either monitor the Internet or block access.176 In the following discussion, each 
of the grounds permitting Internet control are analyzed and compared with 
international human rights standards under the ICCPR and United States 
constitutional standards. 
1. National Security 
In response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2011, the United States 
passed the USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”)177 on October 26, 2001 to provide 
the government with greater authority to search private communication data.178 
Particularly, the Patriot Act authorizes government agents to intercept e-mail 
communications and monitor online activities.179 The Stored Communication Act 
(“SCA”) gives the government further power to require online communication 
service providers to disclose subscribers’ private information with a court warrant, 
in accordance with criminal procedure rules.180 
National security is an explicitly given and justifiable ground under Article 
19.3 of the ICCPR to restrict the free flow of information online.181 Perhaps 
because the ground is highly justifiable, the constitutionality of controlling the 
Internet for the sake of national security is less likely to be controversial or 
challenged by courts.182 The remaining issue is whether the means chosen by the 
United States is necessary to achieve that goal. The principle of proportionality 
would play a critical role here.183 
The means adopted by the United States government include monitoring and 
intercepting, which are equivalent to online surveillance.184 Surveillance would 
                                                          
176 See Julie Adler, Note, The Public’s Burden in a Digital Age: Pressures on Intermediaries and 
the Privatization of Internet Censorship, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 231, 233–34 (2011). 
177 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf. 
178 See Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2006). 
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012). 
180 See id. at § 2703. 
181 See ICCPR, supra note 59. 
182 See ZUCHORA-WALSKE, supra note 175, at 100. 
183 See U.N. GAOR Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess., ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 
(2011). 
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inevitably invade one’s privacy as protected by ICCPR Article 17,185 and the 
Committee has already declared that “[s]urveillance, whether electronic or 
otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic and other forms of 
communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations should be 
prohibited.”186 In light of the interests involved (i.e., online privacy and free flow of 
information) and the degree of interference that would be caused, these measures 
should not be deemed proportional under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR. Further, is 
monitoring every online communication necessary? Or, given the increased interest 
of the free flow of information in cyberspace, do the measures stifle the online free 
flow of information unnecessarily?187 These are questions that the government 
would need to answer under the necessity test of Article 19.3. National security is 
definitely not an absolute authorization by the ICCPR; the measures adopted by the 
government under such ground should still observe the necessity and 
proportionality principle under Article 19.3 of ICCPR. 
2. Child Protection 
The United States Congress first enacted the Communication Decency Act of 
1996 (“CDA”) to criminalize deliberate delivery or display of any message that “in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs” to 
persons under the age of eighteen.188 Although, the act was intended to protect 
minors from harmful materials online, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated it in 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997).189 In holding the statute 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the Court applied a strict scrutiny 
analysis to conclude that the terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” were vague 
and broad.190 “The vagueness of such a regulation[,]” the Court explained, “raises 
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free 
speech.”191 
                                                          
185 Article 17 of ICCPR reads: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” ICCPR, 
supra note 59, at art. 17. 
186 U.N. GAOR Human Rights Committee, 32d Sess., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/16 (1988). 
187 See DELBERT ET AL., supra note 7, at 45–51 (illustrating the overbroad problem of online 
filtering). 
188 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996), declared unconstitutional by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
189 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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Congress’ other effort to control Internet content in 1996 was the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”), which redefined the federal prohibition on 
child pornography to include pornographic images on computers.192 In Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition (2002), the Supreme Court found the CPPA unconstitutional 
on the grounds that the community standards of the CPPA are overly vague and 
broad in determining child pornography, and it was not a necessary means.193 
Congress did not cease efforts to create online child protection measures after 
losing the two battles in the Supreme Court. In 1998, Congress enacted the Child 
Online Protection Act (“COPA”).194 COPA required online commercial providers 
of “material harmful to minors” defined by contemporary community standards, to 
restrict minors’ access to their sites by requiring a credit card number.195 Failure to 
comply with COPA carried criminal liabilities.196 
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004) held 
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit correctly affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that enforcement of COPA should be prohibited because the statute 
violates the First Amendment.197 In its analysis, the Court considered whether less 
restrictive, but just as effective, measures existed than those employed by COPA.198 
The Supreme Court reasoned that blocking and filtering software is a less 
restrictive and likely a more effective alternative, since the filters “impose selective 
restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the 
source.”199 However, there are two other potentially less restrictive alternatives to 
COPA that Congress passed after the district court trial: a ban on misleading 
domain names and a statute for the creation of a “Dot Kids” domain.200 The Court 
remanded the case, in part, to “allow the District Court to take into account those 
additional potential alternatives.”201 
                                                          
192 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2012). 
193 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002). 
194 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006), declared unconstitutional by ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 
(E.D. Pa. 2007). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
198 Id. at 660–67. 
199 Id. at 666–67. 
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Additionally, Congress passed the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 1999 
(“CIPA”) to grant federal funds to public libraries that install software to block 
obscene and pornographic information.202 The Supreme Court upheld CIPA and 
out of six concurring justices, four justices reasoned that CIPA “help[s] public 
libraries fulfill their traditional role of obtaining material of requisite and 
appropriate quality for educational and informational purposes . . . [e]specially 
because public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic material from 
their other collections.”203 
Based on the foregoing, combating child pornography with a selective 
blocking and filtering system is more likely to be held constitutional than a general 
denial of access. With regards to international human rights standards, child 
protection, especially when it comes to child pornography, can be considered an 
important public moral that is content-specific under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR.204 
In this respect, the online child protection makes the United States’ Internet control 
model distinct from China’s general access denied Internet control model. Selective 
blocking and filtering system is appropriate to achieve the goal of protecting 
children and also proportionate under the necessity test of Article 19.3. The 
question left for future discussion, however, is whether there are alternatives to the 
filtering scheme that the international community or U.S. Supreme Court will find 
less restrictive. 
3. Online Copyright Protection 
Using licenses, criminal sanctions, or subsidies to require online service 
providers or ISPs to filter or block content is a means of indirect governmental 
Internet control and should be subject to international human right standards and 
constitutional review. Even if a government’s use of such means passes ICCPR 
Article 19.3’s necessity test,205 the legitimacy of indirect governmental Internet 
control still depends on whether the grounds for restriction are specific, like 
national security or child protection, and not overbroad or general, as in China’s 
case.206 
                                                          
202 Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified as 
amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). 
203 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211–12 (2003). 
204 See ICCPR, supra note 59; see also supra Part II-(III) regarding ICCPR standards to 
determine legitimate internet control. 
205 Part II supra discusses the necessity test. 
206 Compare Part III(I) discussing China’s Internet control model with Part III(III)(1)–(2) 
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Is copyright protection a specific enough ground for the U.S. government to 
justify its government-private partnership scheme to control the Internet? The 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) Section 512(a)–(d) 
prescribes safe harbor guidelines for Online Service Providers (“OSPs”) to 
minimize their copyright infringement liability.207 OSPs are not liable for: 
(1) transitory digital network communications; (2) system caching; (3) information 
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users; and (4) information 
location tools.208 
OSPs are required to adopt a policy to terminate the accounts of copyright 
infringers.209 If the service providers receive a notice from copyright holders or 
assignees, they must remove or block access to the alleged infringing materials.210 
The notification must specifically identify the infringing elements of the 
materials.211 
As will be highlighted in the following analysis, copyright is too broad a 
reason to filter or block online speech and should not automatically exempt private 
OSPs from the international human rights restraints. 
a. Copyright a Murky Ground to Control the Internet 
Copyright protection could be considered a part of public morals under 
ICCPR Article 19.3 and thus a legitimate ground to restrict the free flow of 
information online.212 Nonetheless, since copyright systems do not adopt a 
registration scheme, it is difficult to learn whether a subject is protected by 
someone’s copyright.213 Consequently, copyright infringement is seldom a black-
and-white issue.214 It is also difficult to anticipate whether the defendant can 
successfully invoke the fair use exception.215 
                                                          
207 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)–(d) (2012). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at § 512(i)(1). 
210 Id. at § 512(c)(1)(C). 
211 Id. at § 512(c)(3)(iii); see Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
212 See ICCPR, supra note 59. 
213 See Darrin Keith, Copyright’s Deus Ex Machina: Reverse Registration as Economic Fostering 
of Orphan Works, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 201, 206–09 (2008). 
214 See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 99, 288. 
215 Fair use is deemed as an important mechanism to balance the conflict between freedom of 
speech and copyright by the U.S. Federal Supreme Court. See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
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Under the DMCA, OSPs are required to take down online copyright 
infringing materials after receiving a notice from the right holder.216 This 
empowers private copyright holders, or “claimers,” in lieu of the court, to 
determine whether their copyright is infringed.217 This makes the system 
susceptible to abuse of power.218 Further, the system neutralizes the fair use 
exception because fair use is barely possible to be invoked by the claimed infringer 
against an OSP’s removal of materials prompted by copyright claimers.219 In 
essence, the DMCA is discretionary and nonspecific and therefore cannot serve as 
a legitimate justification to restrict the free flow of information online.220 For this 
same reason, DMCA also resembles the Chinese licensing and filtering censorship 
model.221 Accordingly, the DMCA, as it currently stands, defies the international 
human rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the ICCPR.222 
b. OSPs Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Restraints 
The U.S. government could argue that in its government-private partnership 
scheme, the OSP is the entity that takes down and terminates the accounts, not the 
government. As such there are no international human rights or constitutional 
                                                                                                                                      
According to Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107, “the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by 
that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” The factors for 
determining fair use include 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
216 See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 683–84 (2006) (finding that the take-down procedure sometimes involved misled 
copyright holders’ notices and created problematic requests not provided by the DMCA). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 666. See generally Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559–
60 (1985) (to see idea and expression dichotomy and fair use as an important mechanism to balance the 
freedom of speech and copyright); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
220 See supra Part II discussing ICCPR standards to determine legitimate internet control. 
221 See supra Part III(I) discussing China’s internet control model; see also DAWN C. NUNZIATO, 
VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE 17–19 (2009) 
(characterizing the DMCA as ISP censorship scheme). 
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issues in the strictly private relationship between private parties. However, the 
general principle underlying most worldwide constitutions is that human rights 
protections are the responsibility of the State, and not a private person.223 In the 
United States, there is the state action exception, which holds that when there is a 
“sufficiently close nexus” between the government and a private person’s action, 
the action should be deemed a state action and subjected to constitutional 
restraints.224 Private activities on government property, services supervised and 
investigated by the government, and private assumption of public functions have 
been considered by the Supreme Court to constitute a sufficiently close nexus.225 
The state action theory is not limited to the United States, but has been 
recognized by the UNGA in Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts in Article 6, which reads: 
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State 
by another State shall be considered an act of the former 
State under international law if the organ is acting in the 
exercise of elements of the governmental authority of 
the State at whose disposal it is placed.226 
Dawn C. Nunziato argues that the state action theory should apply in the 
virtual world; that Internet intermediaries, such as OSPs, are serving traditional 
government functions and are in close association with the government; and that 
the government evades responsibility by delegating its power to Internet 
intermediaries.227 In fact, Internet intermediaries in online forums is precisely the 
                                                          
223 See generally G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/2890 
(Mar. 23, 1976) (the Preamble of the ICCPR reads: “[c]onsidering the obligation of States under the 
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
freedoms, . . . .”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution does not cover individual invasion of the individual rights). 
224 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 503, 504 (1985); 
Fernando A. Bohorquez Jr., Note, The Price of PICS: The Privatization of Internet Censorship, 43 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 523, 539–40 (1999). 
225 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private use of government 
property) (deeming that lessee of state property should be bound by the Fourteenth Amendment if lease 
furthers and forms integral part of state operation). See Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 
(1952) (service supervised and investigated by government). See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946) (considering town corporation owner should be subject to First Amendment constraints). 
226 U.N. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001). 
227 NUNZIATO, supra note 221, at 97–100. See also Dawn C. Nunziato, How (not) to Censor: 
Procedural First Amendment Values and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 
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private assumption of public functions that the Supreme Court held to be state 
action, such as the private management of a company town in Marsh v. 
Alabama.228 In cyberspace, the operator or host of a discussion forum enjoys the 
power to shape the rules and order on that forum.229 It is a space involving a 
government-and-private person relationship. Thus, the ICCPR’s human rights 
standards should be applied to prevent the government from dodging constitutional 
responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the notice and takedown scheme was devised by the United 
States legislature in order to relieve OSPs of their burden of secondary copyright 
liability and reduce copyright holders’ expenses for proving infringement.230 The 
safe harbor offered to OSPs for taking down dubious online speech and the power 
of private copyright claimants to call out an infringement both come from 
government authorization.231 From this perspective, the DMCA’s immunity scheme 
is just like China’s and Singapore’s license system of Internet control.232 
The question to be asked about the DMCA is whether Internet intermediaries 
should be assigned secondary liability, especially vicarious infringement 
liability.233 Perhaps realizing vicarious liability would put too much burden on 
OSPs; Congress designed the DMCA immunity scheme to alleviate the burden.234 
However, due to the unclear criteria for the copyright holders in determining 
copyright infringement, the scheme remains cause for concern.235 
                                                          
228 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 501. See Adler, supra note 176, at 253–54. 
229 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in BORDERS IN 
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 90–91 (Brian 
Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997). 
230 See Urban & Quilter, supra note 216, at 636. 
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012). 
232 See supra Part III(I)–(2) discussing China’s and Singapore’s Internet control system. 
233 Vicarious infringement was established and illustrated by MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005) (holding that if the defendant has the ability to supervise the infringing 
conduct and has a direct financial interest from the infringing activity, he should be vicariously liable for 
the infringement). 
234 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2012). 
235 The DMCA only requires the claimed copyright holder to fulfill certain forms of notification, 
and a statement that “the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner 
complained of is not authorized” by it. There is no actual criteria for the OSPs to determine whether the 
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IV. BEST FIT FOR TAIWAN—INTERNET CONTROL OR CENSORSHIP? 
A. Different Constraints in Different Models 
Social norms, market, and architecture are different between the virtual world 
and physical world. But the comparison of three models shows that even in just the 
physical world, the three constraints operate differently. Regional differences, 
including culture, market, and government structure, affect the constraints which, 
in turn, impacts the development of Internet control models. 
In China, the social norms are created and formed by the government.236 
Democracy may be demanded by the people but not available; order is more 
important, superseding all values.237 The restrictive measures for Internet control, 
particularly general and vague terms such as national unity and state honor, make 
China’s Internet control model one of censorship. 
In Singapore, the government’s class license scheme, which lacks 
governmental threats to repeal licenses to force ISPs and ICPs to censor the 
Internet, constitutes a unique architecture, different from the other Internet control 
models across the globe. The Singaporean Internet control architecture reflects, to a 
certain extent, the social norms of Singapore.238 
Finally, the United States’ government-private partnership mode of Internet 
control gives exclusive regulatory power to the online intermediaries.239 This model 
recognizes that the real dominant force in the online market is not the government 
in physical world, but the online intermediaries as internet access gatekeepers. 
                                                          
236 See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Economic Growth, Democracy, the Rule of Law, and 
China’s Future, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 229, 256 (2005) (claiming China as “the ruling elite maintains 
a firm grip on society,” and “the measure of benevolence and self-restraint” are “displayed by the power 
holders.”). 
237 See id. at 256 (arguing that there are “two key aspects to the “anti-political” orientation. One is 
the rejection of a pluralism of interests and viewpoints in favor of a putative and exigent unity of 
purpose. Differences are denied rather than reconciled. Consequently the second is the search for an 
imposition of a singular form of rationality or a unitary principle onto political debate,” and citing Bruce 
Gilley’s argument that “these two aspects of the end-of-politics syndrome—an emphasis on the unity of 
interests and a unitarian principle—are playing a pivotal role in shaping policy in early Twenty-First 
Century China in the concrete form of the doctrine of economyism and the doctrine of proceduralism.”). 
238 See Joseph C. Rodriguez, A Comparative Study of Internet Content Regulation in the United 
States and Singapore: The Invincibility of Cyberporn, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 9, 39 (2000) (“The 
differences between the U.S. and Singapore Internet content regulations demonstrate that the individual 
plays a more subordinate role in Singapore society than in U.S. society. That is, individual rights are 
more subordinate to government interests in Singapore than in the U.S.”). 
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How do the social norm, market, and architecture constraints operate in 
Taiwan? Many of Taiwan’s social norms are similar to China. For instance, 
stemming from Confucianism, China’s tradition, culture, and thought do not 
emphasize IP rights protection.240 Similarly, as observed by Jean Lin, due to the 
fact that “Taiwan’s lack of protection of intellectual property has cultural roots” 
and is impacted by traditional Confucian thoughts, copyright enforcement faces 
difficulties.241 At the same time, however, Taiwan is affected by United States 
intellectual property protection pressure and policies.242 For example, Taiwan 
amended its Copyright Act to fulfill the U.S. government’s expectations.243 
Taiwan’s Copyright Act is constructed by market force from United States, and the 
law itself eventually changes the social norms for protecting copyright.244 
B. Lessons From the Internet Models Comparison 
The comparative analysis of China’s, Singapore’s, and the United States’ 
model shows that the grounds for regulation matter the most in determining 
whether the model constitutes illegitimate censorship or legitimate control under 
Article 19 of the ICCPR. The grounds for the government to restrict the free flow 
of information in cyberspace should not be general and vague, but specific and 
targeted enough to achieve the objectives listed in Article 19.1 and 19.2 of the 
ICCPR.245 
To be legitimate, the means adopted by the government to achieve its control 
objectives must survive Article 19.3’s necessity test.246 The free flow of 
                                                          
240 Heidi Hansen Kalscheur, About “Face”: Using Moral Rights to Increase Copyright 
Enforcement in China, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 513, 515–16 (2012). 
241 Jean Lin, The U.S.—Taiwan Copyright Agreement: Cooperation or Coercion?, 11 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 155, 166–67 (1992). 
242 See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012). 
243 Id.; see also Lin, supra note 241; Laura W. Young, IP Protection in China and Taiwan, THE 
LAW OFFICE OF WANG & WANG, http://www.wangandwang.com/news-articles/articles/ip-protection/ 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (stating “By early 1992 losses due to copyright piracy were estimated at 
U.S. $669 million. The U.S. designated Taiwan as a Priority Foreign Country and initiated an 
investigation into its trade practices, a process that can end with trade sanctions against the listed trade 
partner. Under this pressure, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the new copyright law within two 
months, and the investigation was terminated. Taiwan executed a bilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”) with the U.S. in 1989, in which Taiwan agreed among other things, to 
promulgate a new Copyright Law.”), 
244 Lin, supra note 241 (stating Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 leverages the benefits of 
trading with the U.S. market to achieve compliance with international trade norms). 
245 See supra Part II. See also ICCPR, supra note 59, at Art. 19, general cmt., ¶ 34. 
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information is a greater interest in cyberspace than in the physical world.247 The 
interests of Internet users worldwide should be more important than those of local 
users. Therefore, greater consideration should be given to the free flow of 
information online. 
Systems like the Chinese Great Firewall that create a blocking list and utilize 
general filtering to protect generic and abstract interests are not necessary, as there 
is a lack of “direct and immediate connection between the expression and the 
threat.”248 The licensing systems of both China and Singapore are not the least 
restrictive means,249 mostly because the government has no justification to claim 
ownership over the Internet, and there are other available means (e.g., fines or 
suspension of the license). 
Under the government-private partnership scheme, such as the one adopted by 
the United States, whether a case-by-case filtering and blocking system or a 
selective system for child protection is a necessary means is disputable.250 At the 
very least, these measures are more justifiable under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR 
when used to control the online activities of underage users. 
As to online copyright protection, the immunity scheme adopted by the 
United States to force OSPs to monitor and block access to infringing materials 
does not pass the necessity test because copyright infringement cannot be clearly 
defined.251 The judiciary remains the only suitable authority to decide whether a 
copyright has been infringed, after hearing both sides’ arguments and considering 
both the copyright infringement and fair use exception. Conferring the power of 
judging copyright issues on OSPs or right holders render the government-private 
                                                          
247 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to 
Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 183 (2001). 
248 U.N. GAOR Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess., ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011). 
249 See id. at ¶ 34. 
250 The blocking and filtering software could be argued as not a less-restrictive mean. See, e.g., 
Emily Vander Wilt, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second Attempt to Regulate Indecency 
on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 422–23 (2004) (stating “Blocking and filtering software 
is not a satisfactory alternative to COPA’s regulation of Web producers because it puts the whole onus 
of protecting children on the potential victims of harmful material and their parents, and removes the 
government from any involvement whatsoever.”); Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 
79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 33 (2004) (stating “However, when it comes to the protection of children from 
harmful cultural materials, voluntary protections are highly ineffectual. Most parents and educators do 
not activate the V-chips in their televisions; movie theaters, and most assuredly CD shops and video 
rental stores, often do not enforce the rating and labeling systems in place; and only a minority of 
parents purchase protective filtering software for their home computers.”). 
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partnership scheme suspicious under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR, as protecting 
copyright determined by private parties may not serve as a justifiable ground. 
The real risk of the government-private partnership model is that the 
government could delegate its duty and function to private online service providers 
to evade constitutional or international human rights obligations.252 The United 
States state action theory should therefore be adopted to prevent this kind of risk.253 
A critical lesson drawn from efforts to apply the state action doctrine on the 
Internet is not that there is a State behind the private online service operators, but 
that in cyberspace, the private service operators are the real controllers or power 
holders.254 One commentator rightly points out that there are at least four dangers 
in granting Internet control power to private proxies: the danger of error, the danger 
of self-censorship blocking any content that could precipitate the threat of 
sanctions, the danger of adopting over restrictive measures, and the danger of a 
lesser likelihood to challenge the proxy’s action in the court.255 Each of these 
dangers carries with it a high possibility of causing a chilling effect, thus equating 
to censorship.256 
Tim Wu noted, “[p]ower is power, wherever it is found,” and “private sector 
power over speech can be nearly as terrifying as public power.”257 As long as 
private ICPs or ISPs hold the power to control the Internet there is a danger of a 
chilling effect. International human rights cannot be ignored simply because the 
ICP or ISP is not a government entity. The state action theory must be carefully 
used on a case-by-case basis to ensure that Internet users’ right to the free flow of 
information is protected from private online services operators. 
                                                          
252 See supra Part III-(III) discussing adoption of state action theory. 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 
101–03 (2011) (suggesting that it is the private companies that are conducting today’s censorship); 
Lawrence Soley, Private Censorship, Corporate Power, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY 
THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION 15, 15–28 (Robert Atkins & Sevtlana Mintcheva eds., 2006) (discussing 
the expansion of corporate power in relationship to censorship). 
255 Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the 
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27–32 (2006). See also Jay Wahlquist, The World 
Summit of the Information Society: Making the Case for Private Industry Filtering to Control 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Transnational Internet Censorship Conflict, 1 INT’L. & MGMT. REV. 
283, 300–02 (2005). 
256 Kreimer, supra note 255 (discussing dangers of censorship by proxy). 
257 Tim Wu, Is Filtering Censorship? The Second Free Speech Tradition, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: 
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Article 19 of the ICCPR only requires a state to protect the free flow of 
information in cyberspace; the State may but is not required to restrict the online 
free flow of information on the grounds of certain important government 
interests.258 A State will always encounter challenges in circumscribing the right of 
worldwide online users when doing so in the name of a local interest, no matter 
how trivial.259 Child protection, an issue that continues to gain attention globally, 
may be a justifiable ground. However, with regards to vague interests like national 
security, copyright infringement, defamation, and other interests that are still more 
local, the State should always be cautious in choosing whether to regulate the 
Internet on the basis of such local interests and the type of means used to regulate. 
C. Future of Taiwan’s Internet Control: Remaining Meager is Not Evil 
Juxtaposing Taiwan’s current meager Internet controls260 with those of China, 
Singapore, and the United States, makes evident that Taiwan’s paradigm is a 
borderline censorship model similar to the United States’ government-private 
partnership scheme. The Child Protection Act adopts a selective program 
demanding self-discipline and access denial from ISPPs at the request of the 
government to shield minors from online pornographic materials.261 This measure 
is specific and likely sufficiently necessary to survive Article 19.3’s necessity test. 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s current Copyright Act paradigm is problematic 
and a lightning rod for controversy. The immunity afforded to OSPs under 
Taiwan’s Copyright Act, which is similar to the United States’ DMCA, is 
potentially unconstitutional and certainly susceptible to criticism.262 Furthermore, 
by compelling OSPs to monitor and block access in cyberspace, Taiwan’s 
Copyright Act is unjustifiable restriction under Article 19.3 of the ICCPR. 
                                                          
258 See supra Part II discussing legitimate grounds to restrict freedom of expression under ICCPR. 
259 See David R. Johnson, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367, 1370–74 (1996). 
260 See, e.g., Taiwan’s Child Protection Act and Copyright Act. See Child and Youth Welfare 
Protection Act (Taiwan), promulgated on Aug. 8, 2010, available at http://lis.ly.gov.tw/lgcgi/lglaw?@ 
18:1804289383:f:NO%3DC705125*%20OR%20NO%3DC005125%20OR%20NO%3DC105125$$4$$
$NO (last visited Apr. 20, 2013); The Copyright Act, supra note 15. 
261 See art. 46 of the Child and Youth Welfare Protection Act, supra note 260 (last visited Nov. 9, 
2013). 
262 See Fa-Chang Cheng, The Reflection of DMCA Safe Harbor Rule in Thinking of General 
Liability for the ISP Through its Users’ Violation of Law within Cyberspace, 1 INT’L J. SOUND, MUSIC 
& TECH. 5, 9 (2011), available at http://www.3kbioxml.com/3k/index.php/IJSMT/article/viewFile/88/50 
(stating “To embody the “notice and take down” policy into the law protecting other interests may run 
the risk of directly conflicting with the freedom of speech by its nature and may be invalid because the 
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Taiwan currently faces calls for legislation that implements a more intricate 
Internet control model. In June of 2013, the Intellectual Property Office proposed 
an amendment to copyright law to establish a blacklist for foreign websites that 
infringe copyright and require the ISPs to block those websites.263 Under the 
pressure from Internet groups’ advocacy and public criticism, the Intellectual 
Property Office finally withdrew such attempt.264 As this issue continues to 
develop, one thing is certain: Taiwan has a choice between fully endorsing and 
practicing Internet censorship or protecting the free flow of information online with 
a moderate but necessary control system. 
How should Taiwan Internet control legislation evolve to comply with 
international human rights? Stop following the United States’ stringent and 
expanding online copyright protection model would be the first step. Furthermore, 
in designing any further Internet control mechanism, as lessoned from the models 
comparison, the protected interest must be specific and concrete, and the measures 
adopted for protecting such interest must be necessarily designed under Article 
19.3 of ICCPR. Keeping in place the current meager online regulation paradigm is 
not an evil. After all, the Internet control models of China, Singapore, or United 
States, no matter how different they are, represent only one type of Internet 
governance—the model of regulating Internet by national government and law.265 
Opposite of this internal government and law model are self-regulating and market 
and economic models for Taiwan to select. A mixture of both does not violate the 
                                                          
263 Maira Sutton, Taiwanese Users Thwart Government Plans to Introduce Internet Blacklist Law, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 3, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/taiwanese-users-
thwart-government-plans-introduce-internet-blacklist-law. 
264 See Sharone Tobias, Internet and Press Freedom in Taiwan, THE DIPLOMAT (June 28, 2013), 
http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2013/06/28/internet-and-press-freedom-in-taiwan/. 
265 Lawrence B. Solum observed and categorized into five Internet governance models as 
following: 1. The model of cyberspace and spontaneous, which refers to the Internet self-autonomous 
right. This model can be understood as that the Internet community should govern by itself. 2. The 
model of transnational institutions quasi-private cooperative and international organizations based on 
the treaty agreement between nations, which refers the Internet governance to build a structure like 
national borders in the cyberspace as a whole. 3. The model of code and Internet architecture, which to 
certain extent barrows the concept of Lawrence Lessig the code is the law in cyberspace. Internet 
governance then refers to the protocols or software that decides the Internet orders. 4. The model of 
national governments and law, which relies the Internet governance on the internal regulations of each 
states with the traditional notion of borders. 5. The model of market regulation and economics which 
assumes that market forces drive the fundamental decisions about the nature of the Internet. See 
Lawrence, Models of Internet Governance, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
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requirements of international human rights and Taiwan could form its “let the 
internet free”266 paradigm as the fourth Internet control model. 
                                                          
266 See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (stating “We have no 
elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that 
with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you 
possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.”). 
